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Different Paths and Divergent Policies in the UN 
Security System: Brazil and Mexico in 
Comparative Perspective 
ARTURO C. SOTOMAYOR VELAzQUEZ 
How can we explain foreign policy variation among UN member states? Brazil and Mexico 
are the most likely cases for international primacy in the UN system, given their territorial 
dimension, demographic tendencies, economic importance, geo political location and rela-
tive weight in Latin America. Yet, despite their structural similarities, their policies and 
behaviour jn the UN system have varled~ both in terms of engagement with the Security 
Council and commirment regarding peacekeeping. By comparing two of Latin America's 
most influential countries, this study identifies the underlying conditions and mechanisms 
that explain their differences in behaviour and policy in the UN. In particular, this article 
analyses and contrasts how geopolitics and civil-military relations in Brazil and Mexico 
affect their incentives to participate in international organizations and their overall inter-
national commitment to peace. 
Brazil and Mexico are among Latin America's largest and most powerful states. 
They share many structural similarities, including the region's largest mHitary 
forces and biggest economies, as well as regional influence - Brazil in the 
Southern Cone of South America and Mexico in Central America. They also 
have similar political systems, with the presidents vested with the power to 
conduct foreign policy, and with a hierarchically organized career Foreign 
Service, complemented by intermediate political appointments. Given these simi-
larities, they are relevant cases for study. However, the two countries have histori-
cally evinced different forms of foreign policy behaviour and international roles. 
Nowhere are rhese differences more evident than in the UN system, in which both 
countries have followed different paths. For instance, Brazil has been a major UN 
troop contributor, an active non-permanent member of the Security Council and 
a serious candidate for a permanent position. In cootras .. ., Mexico has resisted 
armed engagement under the UN flag, and has rarely occupied a non-permanent 
seat on the Security Council. In fact, it has not shown interest in becoming a per-
manent member of the Council. These differences are even more puzzling given 
the trends and developments in the post-cold War era. Both Brazil and Mexico 
witnessed the re-emergence of regionalism in the Americas; and the democratiza-
tion of their respective political systems. In many ways, regionalism and democra· 
tization should provide an especially potent impetus to join international 
organizations, since the latter can often help transitional states credibly carty 
out democratic reforms and assume international commitments. 1 Yet whereas 
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Brazil appears to assume an international leadership role, Mexico's diplomacy 
has been characterized by caution and distaste for a protagonist role in the UN 
security system. 
This article examines their varied approaches towards UN collective security 
and peacekeeping. It will focus primarily on the period from 1990 to 2005, which 
enables the collapse of the Soviet bloc to be held as a constant systemic variable. It 
also helps to analyse how democratization processes, which occurred in 1988 in 
Brazil and 2000 in Mexico, affected outcomes. 
Two arguments are developed to explain the policy differences in the UN 
system. First, Mexico's less assertive UN diplomacy is in part a consequence of 
its geopolitical proximity to the United States. Those areas where Mexico 
might exert the most impact in the UN system are also well within the US 
sphere of influence, so the country's performance is constrained by the over-
whelming presence of its northern neighbour. By contrast, Brazil is more 
distant from US hegemony, providing relative foreign policy autonomy: it has 
more alliance choices than those which are proximate to Washington. This line 
of argument is consistent with mainstream hegemonic explanations regarding 
weak state vulnerability to the aggressive demands of great powers.2 
Second, Brazil's active participation in UN peacekeeping is related to the 
extension of civilian control over the military in the context of democratization. 
Indeed, foreign policy options not only reflect structural and systemic constraints, 
but are determined by trends in domestic politics. Peacekeeping represents a mili-
tary dimension of foreign policy in which uniformed personnel are deployed to 
accomplish diplomatic and political goals. Yet, military backing for peacekeeping 
is not universal; some:: military institutions are reluctant to join such missions 
because they offer few institutional and professional enticements. Other armed 
forces are more willing to join a UN force in order to contribute to national 
interests or prestige. Therefore, the extent to which civilian governments can 
deploy troops abroad is determined by how much control they exercise over 
the military branches. In this regard, Brazil and Mexico differ substantially, as 
both countries exercise different levels of military accountability. This often 
translates into different defence policies and divergent levels of peacekeeping 
participation. Therefore, this second explanation is consistent with most civil-
military relations theories, which contend that the dynamics of domestic civil-
military relationships shape the likelihood of conflict and cooperation at the 
international level. 3 
These two arguments are based on two distinct levels of analysis -systemic 
and domestic - and can be potentially contradictory, especially if a neo-realist 
explanation is tested against a domestic politics explanation.' Nevertheless, the 
point here is not to determine which level matters most; they both do. More inter-
esting and challenging is to determine how the two levels vary from country to 
country, and how they interact to determine policy outcomes. 
The article begins with a brief overview of Brazilian and Mexican partici-
pation in the UN security system. It then discusses how different structural con-
ditions and patterns of civil-military relations have divergent effects on their 
engagements in UN peace operations. 
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Historical Considerations 
Since its inception, the UN has played an important role in Brazilian and Mexican 
foreign policies. Both were founding members and actively participated in the 
San Francisco conference. They had been fully committed to the Allies during 
the Second World War and their contributions were rewarded in 1946, when 
they were the only representatives from Latin America at the first Security 
Council meeting. Since then the two states have participated in all major UN 
bodies and have been among the world's major contributors to the UN regular 
budget. s 
From the outset, Brazil and Mexico expressed their opposition to the Security 
Council's concentration of power vis-a-vis the General Assembly, but they also 
understood that a compromise was necessaty to establish the world body. The 
two countries have continued to insist on the democratizacion of the UN and 
the importance of the General Assembly.- Despite their many differences and 
at times rival positions in the world body, participation served the common 
purpose of reinforcing their relative independence of the U nired States, exercising 
their regional influence in Latin America, building coalitions with other partners 
and expressing their mainly legalistic view of world politics. 7 
Nevertheless, by 1947 it was clear that a new configuration of power was 
developing, one which allowed little room for lesser powers. Mexico was the 
first Latin American country to reconsider its position in the UN and decided 
not to re-apply for election to the Security Council until 1980. In the view of 
many Mexican diplomats, bipolarity provided few opportunities for dissent, so 
confrontation with the United States and the Soviet Union had to be avoided at 
all costs. Similarly, its distancing on security issues reinforced its principled jud-
gement about the flawed design and functioning of the Security Council itself, 
which became stymied by the vetoes and counter-vetoes of the major powers. 8 
In the course of the cold war, Mexico served on the Secu rity Council only once 
after 1946 - in 1980-81. The latter, however, was more the result of a compro-
mise than of assertiveness. Mexico was elected to the 'Larin American' seat, after 
the rival alternatives, Cuba and Colombia, reached a compromise and withdrew: 
However, by the early 1980s a new global arms race was occurring and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan also brought an end to detente, leaving Mexico little 
room to exercise influence in the Security Council. Another 22 years would 
pass before Mexican diplomats returned to the Council in 2002-03, to face yet 
another global crisis. 
A similar attitude prevailed with regards to peacekeeping. Aside from deploy-
ing two military observers to Kashmir during the 1950s, Mexico's diplomacy has 
long been characterized by distaste for anything that violated the principle of non-
intervention. Consequently, during the cold war, Mexico tended to be a passive 
state, rarely involved in high politics and often abstaining from sending troops 
abroad. This is not to say thar Mexico was indifferent to the main issues of inter-
national security, as it played a role in promoting nuclear disarmament (for which 
Mexican UN Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles shared a Nobel peace prize in 
1982 with Sweden's Ava Myrdal) and pacifying Central America in the 
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1980s. 10 However, Mexico was highly selective in its security forum options, 
often discriminating against the UN. In other words, it did not perceive or view 
the UN security system as an ideal forum to express its interest or show commit-
ment; this often translated into a mostly defensive, and at times legalistic, multi· 
lateral policy." 
By contrast, Brazil was an assertive non-permanent member of the Security 
Council in 1946-47, 1951-52, 1963-64, 1967-69, 1988-89 (and 2004-05). 
In contrast to Mexico, Brazil has always regarded its exclusion from a permanent 
seat as a snub to be redressed. As a consolation prize, Brazil was given the right to 
be the first country to address the UN General Assembly every year during its 
annual meeting. However, it is notable that between 1968 and 1988, Brazil too 
had a period in which it decided not to participate in the Council. According to 
Ricardo Sennes, the assessment at the time was that holding that seat 
would bring political costs that would not be compensated by the benefits of 
being part of an agency that had extremely little decision·making power, 
and that was clearly dominated by the great powers, in which Brazil 
would not have veto power, and within which the members were fiercely 
antagonistic among themselves. 12 
Equally important was the military coup of 1964, which effectively installed a 
dictatorship that would last for more than two decades. The military regime had 
an ambitious agenda, including the development of nuclear power, but partici-
pation in the Security Council was not part of the plan. Like most bureau-
cratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Brazilian military leaders 
reasoned that isolationism would silence international criticism of a poor 
human rights record. Although Brazil did join international military missions 
through the Organization of American States, it did not become heavily involved 
in UN peacekeeping again until re-democratization in the 1990s. 
Still, Brazil had been far more involved in peacekeeping than Mexico. Histori-
cally, it has been one of Latin America's major troop contributors, having 
deployed UN observers and troops to missions in Sinai, Gaza, Congo, India-
Pakistan and Cyprus. From 1957 to 1967, Brazil deployed its largest contribution 
to date with an infantry battalion to the Gaza strip as part of the UN mission in 
the Middle East (UNEF I), which gave 6300 Brazilians an experience of peace-
keeping. 13 According to Davis B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, between 1947 
and 1988, Brazil was among the top 32 contributors, supplying regular personnel 
for a substantial share of operations, although it did little to finance them. 14 
Consequently, Brazil's and Mexico's commitment to international security and 
peace through the UN was mostly determined by systemic factors and domestic 
trends. The early 1990s would bring fundamental changes to both states, with the 
end of bipolarity and their own slow transitions to democracy. At the same time, 
policy differences between Brazil and Mexico in the UN system became more 
evident in this period. A quick comparison between the two countries during the 
years 1990-2005 illustrates this point. As already noted, Brazil became a non-
permanent member of the Security Council at regular intervals, and claimed a per-
manent seat. '5 Jt also increased its peacekeeping contribution in the 1990s and early 
I: 
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2000s. By 2008, it ranked as the thineenth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping 
forces; although it was still behind Uruguay and Argentina among Latin American 
troop providers. From 1990 to 2005, Brazil deployed 7444 soldiers to UN missions 
in Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, 
Mozambique and Uganda/Rwanda. '6 Some of these contributions reflected 
Brazi1'~ zone of regional projection; Portuguese Africa and the Caribbean were 
preferred. For instance, in 2004 Brazil deployed a full banalion to Haiti and since 
then it has led the UN mission in Pon·au-Prince.17 
On the other hand, Mexico was disinterested in participating in the Security 
Council and in 1991 declined an opponunity to be a candidate. In 2002, when it 
finally teturned to the Council, a national debate emerged over the government's 
decision to become part of a world body that had hitherto been characterized as 
requiring profound reform. '" Similarly, Mexico declined' to respond to calls for 
troops from the UN Secretariat. When El Salvador requeste<i Mexican peacekeepers 
to suppon its pacification process, Mexico refrained from deploying soldiers and 
instead sent members of the judicial police to instruct the newly formed Salvadoran 
national police in the finer points of anti-corruption measlIres.19 Peace negotiators 
were sutprised at Mexico's stance, given that it had played am active role in bringing 
peace to Central America through the Contadora initi ative. For this reason, 
scholars consider Mexico to be a reluctant middle power. zo 
Geograllhy and Proximity to Power: The Bilateral versus Multilateral Policy 
The mmt fundamental and perhaps obvious differences ,.eparating Mexico and 
Brazil are geography and proximity to power. Realin thinkers have often 
argued that balance of power issues shape alignment beh .. viour among powerful 
states, even for smaller states in the developing world.>' A s Stephen Walt argues, 
'weak states are also likely to be ~~pe,ially sensitive to proximate power. Where 
great powers have both global interests and global capabiilities, weak states will 
be concerned primari1y with events in their immediate vic inity'.22 
To sC)me extent, Mexico reflects this condition, since it is reluctant to pick 
fights with the United States, particularly on issues that are sensitive in Washing-
ton.23 Hegemony not only restrains Mexico's international behaviour, but 
imposes a foreign policy dilemma. Policy makers wan~ to maintain relative 
foreign policy autonomy, but simultaneously cannot openly oppose Washington 
in the UN. As Mario Ojeda argues: 
Th~ United States recognizes and accepts Mexico's need to dissent from 
United States policy in everything that is fundamental for Mexico, even if 
it is important but not fundamental for the US. In exchange, Mexico 
cooperates in everything that is fundamental or merely important for the 
United States, though not for Mexico," 
This means that Mexico simply cannot aspire to playa key role in the Security 
Council hecause it might find itself opposing US global in terests on issues such 
as non-n4clear proliferation, peaceful settlement in the Middle East and terror-
ism. As Peter Smith notes, 
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Mexico's strategic position has been severely restricted by the hegemonic 
power of the U.S ... Those places where Mexico might exert the most 
impact are also well within the U.S. sphere of influence, so Mexico's per-
formance as a pivotal state is continually subordinate to the overwhelming 
presence of the U.S.2S 
Indeed, Mexico's relative autonomy was tested in 2003 in the face of the Iraq 
crisis. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, the country was on 
the horns of a dilemma. Although a resolution to authorize the use of force 
never reached the Council, Mexico decided, principally for domestic political 
reasons, to follow France, China and Russia in opposing the United States. 
Domestically, this antagonized the Mexican business community because it 
caused confrontation with Washington - and reduced the level of formal 
contact berween the presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox. On one level, 
the incident appears to contradict the argument that Mexico cannot openly 
oppose American interests in the UN. On another level, it can be seen as evidence 
that abstention from participating in the Security Council avoids unnecessary 
confrontation with the United States.2• When Mexico reclaimed a non-perma-
nent seat in the Council for the 2009-10 biennium, the national debate was 
focused not on how the country should participate in the Council, but whether 
it was appropriate and pertinent to be involved at a1l 2 ? 
By contrast, Brazil has more foreign policy options available because it is not 
conditioned by preponderant influences and trading asymmetry. As Celso Lafer 
argues, 'for Brazil, the concept of frontier of cooperation has a much wider sig-
nificance. It applies, for example, to its maritime frontier in the South Atlantic, 
as well as the line to its African neighbours' .28 The weakness of hegemony in 
the Southern Cone of South America also enables Brazil to assume a larger 
regional role and even prominent position in world affairs than Mexico. As 
Peter Hakim argues, 'Brazil has sought to serve as a counterweight to the 
United States. At times, it has appeared intent on establishing a South American 
pole of power in the western hemisphere'. 2. 
Furthermore, the United States matters not only in terms of proximity and 
power, but also in terms of political and social influence. Since the early 1990s, 
there has been a tendency towards bilateralism in Mexico, in which the United 
States role in Mexican politics has increased at the expense of multilateralism. 
For instance, Mexico has one of the largest economies in the world in terms of 
gtoss domestic product (GDP), and is one of the largest oil producers and 
trading nations worldwide (by far the most important in Latin America). But 
its economic and trade policy relies heavily on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFT A), since more than 86 per cent of its exports go to the 
United States and Canada.30 With more than 70 per cent of its GDP derived 
from trade, the bilateral relationship with Washington has a predominance that 
no other issue occupies in the Mexican foreign policy agenda. 
There is no doubt that NAFTA has made Mexico and the United States close 
partners. This is evident in Mexico's voting behaviour in the General Assembly 
and in its historic support for Cuba in the UN Commission for Human Rights. 
370 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Fernimdez de Castro note that in the General 
Assembly Mexico's voting coincidence with the United States rose after NAFT A 
was signed, from only 14.5 per cent in 1985 to 41.6 per cent in 1995 and 33 per 
cent in 2000.31 In the Commission for Human Rights, Mexico supported a resol-
ution in 2004 that condemned Cuba's human rights practices, an important shift 
that almost caused a formal break in diplomatic relations with Cuba.32 
At the same time, a large number of Mexican migrants (one out of ten 
Mexicans) have permanently established themselves in the United States.33 This 
social dynamic explains why Mexico has expanded its network of consulates in 
the United States (49 compared to 70 embassies worldwide). These consulates 
sustain projects targeted directJy to the Mexican - American communities, such 
as formal education programmes in Spanish for public schools, arranging meetings 
with leaders of immigrant clubs and Mexican politicians and fostering various cul-
tural and folklore programmes to enhance 'Mexicanness' (mexicanidad).34 
Nevertheless, this strong bilateral policy has had a political cost. Personnel, 
resources, money and infrastructure go into North American representation, 
while diplomatic missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the UN are poorly 
funded and staffed. In some cases, it is more costly to maintain a consulate in a 
US city than an embassy in Africa or Asia. In Aftica, Mexico has only six embas-
sies, attenuating links and networks with the strong African community in the 
UN. Mexico often lacks information about peacekeeping missions in Africa 
and the Middle East, and faces serious challenges to promote its interests in the 
UN system. With limited diplomatic ties in Africa, the Middle-East and Asia, 
Mexico is clearly at a disadvantage in the General Assembly, the G-77 and the 
Non-Aligned Movement (made mostly of African and Asian states). In practice, 
Mexico does not exercise 'capital-to-capital and South-South diplomacy' to 
foster UN initiatives. Instead, Mexico's efforts focus on implementing a strong 
bilateral diplomacy with the United States. 
In contrast to Mexico, Brazil's diaspora is smaller and its economy less heavily 
dependent on US trade. Brazil has more than 100 embassies around the world, 
Latin America's largest diplomatic network. This allows the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) to reach out to a larger number of countries whose 
votes are strategically valuable in the UN system, especially in the General Assem-
bly. Thus, more than any other Latin American country (with the exception of 
Cuba), Brazil places a considerable importance on Africa. Its active presence in 
the continent can be traced to the 1970s, when it took an active stand against 
colonialism and signed bilateral economic agreements with new African repub-
lics, mostly Lusophone countries.35 
Brazil's diplomatic networks enable Itamaraty to implement a 'capital-to-
capital and a South-South diplomacy', thus strengthening its UN position. For 
example, in 2003, India, Brazil and South Africa established a trilateral initiative 
(lBSA) to promote issues of mutual interest, including advancing their bids for a 
permanent Security Council seat.36 The freedom to form strategic partnerships 
with other countries in the developing world gives Brazilian diplomacy the capacity 
to adapt established international norms to counter the dominance of the North. As 
Monica Herz argues, 'working within IBSA, Brazil might seek to change the 
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assumptions that underpin the workings of the UN Security Council, the WTO 
[World Trade Organization], and maybe the fragile Nuclear Non Proliferation 
T reary regime'. 37 Consequently, Brazil is in a stronger position than Mexico to 
exercise a multilateral policy through its more diversified diplomatic agenda. 
However, Brazil has been less successful in convincing the United States of the 
benefits of having a Latin American countty permanently represented in the Secur-
ity Council because, paradoxically, it lacks what Mexico has in excess - a strong 
and fairly institutionalized strategic partnership with the United States. 
Democratization, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping 
Dag Hammarskjold is constantly cited for arguing that peacekeeping was not a 
job for soldiers, but they were the only ones who could do it. Militaty influence 
in decision-making processes is therefore relevant for understanding troop contri-
butions. In democratic theory, military advisers are supposed to be non-partisan 
and de-politicized. In practice, they rarely are. Militaty advisers usually have 
strong opinions about deployments abroad. And their views are often coloured 
politically by bureaucratic-organizational interests and the dynamics of civil-
militaty relations. 
Indeed, in both countries troop commitments for UN peacekeeping are influ-
enced by different patterns of civil-military interaction. Both experienced demo-
cratization processes that put an end to years of authoritarianism. In both cases, 
the transition to democracy was slow and fought out between liberal politicians 
and autocratic elites. But their dictatorships had been quite different. The fact 
that Brazil's army ruled the country while the Mexican armed forces accepted 
civilian rule is a key to understanding the former's participation in peacekeeping 
and the latter's refusal to do so. The democratization process in Brazil entailed a 
reform of the military and an effort to consolidate civilian rule in defence pol-
icies.38 In Mexico, the transition to democracy required electoral reform to 
enable small parties to compete in a mainly hegemonic-party system; but military 
reform was not part of the impetus for democratization. 39 
Brazil has used peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool and a mechanism to 
bring the military closer to international dynamics. The military still enjoys 
status from of its primary mission as protector of the 'homeland', particularly 
the Amazon"o Nevertheless, Brazil has provided the military with new oper-
ational roles in the prevention of illicit activities and in international peacekeep-
ing. Full democratic and civilian control over the military is still far from being 
achieved, but Brazil's civilian leadership has redefined relations between the 
armed forces and political authorities'" 
For example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's elevation to the presidency in 
1994 altered the balance between civilians and the military. In 1996, Cardoso 
published Brazil's first National Defence Policy. Although limited in scope, this 
delineated the parameters for the deployment of the armed forces into four situ-
ations: war, prevention of war, insecurity and peace,42 In effect, this provided the 
context for contributions to peacekeeping. In 2000, Cardoso was able to establish 
an integrated Ministry of Defence and appoint a civilian as head of the defence 
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sector Y Although the military bargained for reserved domains in exchange for a 
return to barracks and some service commanders opposed such measures 
altogether, the normalization of civil-military relations assisted Brazil's foreign 
policy agenda." 
It was in this context of democratization that Brazil sent its first battalion to 
Angola in 1994, comprising about 900 soldiers. The mission ended abruptly after 
the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) violated the 
ceasefire agreements in 1997, by which time more than 4174 soldiers and 48 
naval personnel had been involved in the UN mission, making it Brazil's largest 
peacekeeping contribution in the post-dictatorship era.45 
Peacekeeping thus became part of a much broader poli cy of military reform in 
Brazil. First, it was an attempt to integrate defence with fDreign policy by provid-
ing diplomats with additional tools to exercise international primacy. Second, 
engageIl1ent in peace operations provided additional monetary incentives, 
whereby the salaries of soldiers deployed abroad were -substantially increased 
to parallel those earned by ltamaraty diplomats. This, along with a universal 
increase in military salaries, enabled Cardoso to qualm" general feeling of dis-
content among the armed forees.46 
The administration of President Luiz Inilcio Lula da Silva gave peacekeeping a 
new impetus from 2004 when Brazil sent Over 1200 troops to non-Lusophone 
Haiti, potentially the country's largest foreign military deployment since 
Angola. In 2004, Brazilian generals commanded a UN force of 6700 (mainly 
South American troops) and 1600 police.47 This military engagement coincided 
with the UN reform process, when Brazil publici y announced that it aspired to 
a permanent seat, and joined Germany, India and Japan in a diplomatic campaign 
to enlarge the Security Council. In this sense, the most relev.ant difference between 
Lula's and Cardoso's foreign policies lies in the latter's willingness to act in a 
more assertive and proactive way.48 BrllziJ's role in peacekeeping i~ rhus a 
foreign policy tool that provides a solid foundation for its aspiration in the UN 
system. "Ibis also reveals that a degree of military reform has occurred, since 
the armed forces have been more willing to accept international roles defined 
by dviJian insriturions.49 
Brazilian military doctrine and geopolitical thinking h.-ve clearly assisted the 
process by which the armed forces have been slowly integrated into Brazil's grand 
strategy. Just as ltamaraty's diplomatic raison d'hre in the UN has focused on the 
Security Council reform, the dominant and perennial feature of military thinking 
has been deve/oping power pro;ecrion abroad to become a major military power. 
As a well-known expert on Brazilian military politics argues, 'ever since the early 
1920s, and in a sense ever since the first Portuguese arrived, Brazil has been 
embarked on a Latin American version of Manifest Destiny'. 50 It is in this 
sense that Brazilian commanders have often linked peacek .. eping to greater visi-
bility of Brazil's military competence. For Brazilian military experts, a force 
that can deploy its soldiers abroad can equally mobiliz .. them to counter a 
threat from a near-by enemy. Consequently, military thinking coincides with dip-
lomatic doctrine as both generals and ambassadors perceiv .. potential benefits in 
deploying rroops abroad.s1 As a Brazilian military officer argued, 
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given the remaining relevance of peacekeeping as a consequence of many latent 
conflicts spread throughout the globe, Brazil's enhanced participation in UN 
operations, if it does not contribute directly to gaining the objectives established 
in the current National Defense Policy, at a minimum will help to keep the 
prestige of the country as a distinguished contributor of UN peace efforts. 52 
Conversely, civil-military relations in Mexico have not been subject to a 
radical change since the advent of democracy in 2000. Decisions about joining 
UN missions rely on two strong federal bureaucracies, the Ministry of Defence 
(Army and the Air Force) and the Ministry of the Navy - not the Foreign Ministry 
(Cancil/eria). The armed forces, however, do not have a unified voice. The Navy, 
with more international exposure than the Army but fewer personnel, supports 
peacekeeping. In 2004, the Navy devised a plan to allow personnel to join a 
peacekeeping force.53 Nevertheless, peacekeeping often requires a level of man-
power that only armies can provide. The Mexican Army, however, has 
opposed such engagement. In June 2005, Patricia Olamendi, the then Deputy 
Foreign Secretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, resigned in 
protest after President Vicente Fox's spokesman Ruben Aguilar flatly contra-
dicted her statement that Mexico might someday contribute personnel to peace-
keeping. Apparently, the Defence Ministry complained of civilian meddling in 
military affairs and, soon after Fox asserted that his administration would 
never authorize troops for UN missions, much to the chagrin of the Cancilleria.54 
The bureaucratic competition and division of labour between the Cancilleria and 
the Ministry of Defence goes back to a pact in 1929, when the Revolutionary 
Institutional Party (PRJ) was established, whereby the military accepted the demili-
tarization of politics and the civilians conceded institutional autonomy. This facili-
tated a division of labour and made possible the emergence of a consensus, placing 
special emphasis on civilian supremacy, since there was nothing above the party. 
By 1946, when the first civilian president was elected, the military institution had 
not only been unified and disciplined, but had also been successfully subordinated 
to the civilian power. To ensure that the armed forces would remain loyal to the 
PRI, politicians limited budgets, reorganized military zones and imposed education 
programmes designed to reinforce loyalty to the party and instil discipline. 
Military-party links thus regulated, managed and co-opted the military'S political 
behaviour, in exchange for which the armed forces had autonomy to decide pro-
motions, doctrine, strategy, and, of course, military operations.55 
The democratization of Mexican politics in 2000 did not modify the civil-
military pact itself, but simply altered the political context. The Air Force and 
the Army continued to focus on their domestic missions, consisting essentially 
of maintaining control of the intelligence community, providing public services 
in rural communities, containing revolutionary movements (such as the Zapatista 
movement in Chiapas and elsewhere) and curbing trans-national organized crime 
(mostly drug trafficking).'" Unlike the Brazilian armed forces, the Mexican mili-
tary has never aspired to power projection because since the Second World War 
Mexico has not faced any external enemies. Even though the border with the 
United States is increasingly problematic due to drug trafficking and 'terrorism'; 
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the situation does not raise the spectre of armed invasion, but requires daily socio-
economic interaction with the northern neighbour. 
Deployment of troops for UN operations is troubling for the Ministry of 
Defence since it would be perceived as weakening the military's ability to 
respond to its primary domestic roles. Various contentions have been used. 
First, it is argued that mast Mexican soldiers do not fulfil the foreign language 
requirements established by the UN for observational posts, since mandatory 
English courses have never been part of their curricula. Second, there is 
concern about over-stretch when the military is already heavily engaged in mul-
tiple operations at home, including law enforcement and anti-drugs campaigns. 
Third, the military has shown anxiety about an increased involvement of US 
military forces in training peacekeepers for UN operations.57 Finally, there are 
questions about budgets and peacekeeping costs, such as vaccines, uniforms 
and equipment for the mission, none of whi.:h are subsidized by the UN. Ulti-
mately, senior officers regard missions abroad as an honourable task, yet a tem-
porary exile to keep them busy and away from domestic politics.-~8 
To date, there are few signs of change wjthin tbe Mexican Army. In 2006, 
Felipe Calderon took office as president and called upon 450,000 military and 
federal security personnel to re-gain control a f areas that had been lost to narco-
tics. The Army has thus been busy bolstering. and, in some cases disarming and 
temporarily replacing, state and municipal pelice in key drug trafficking centres 
along the US-Mexican border and Pacific an-d Gulf coasts. This means that the 
military has not only increased its domestic presence, but has few incentives to 
participate in external missions with the UN. "9 
In sum, unlike the Brazilian military, the Mexican military has not been the 
main obstacle to democratization. The armed forces have had fewer incentives 
to rely on international commitments to aILchor domestic reforms, and have 
experienced relatively linle pressure from the outside world. Hence, the 
Mexican army has been able to successfully override the demand for reform, 
while maintaining its traditional mission and doctrine. 
Conclusions 
This article represents a preliminary step to ~nderstanding wby countries with 
relatively similar underlying conditions and power capabilities behave differently 
in the UN. A comparative analysis of Brazil alId Mexico provides not only a con-
textual description of Brazilian and Mexican foreign policies in the UN system, 
but also delineates causal mechanisms that explain divergent foreign policies. 
In doing so, this analysis has followed the comparative foreign policy approach. 
This analysis has also shown the tension thac regional powers often face when 
they are proximate to hegemony. Bilateral and multilateral policy, esp~cially in 
the realm of security, are not always complementary and, as the Brazilian and 
Mexican case illustrates, the closer a smaller country is to hegemony, the less 
likely that it will be able to exercise a leadership role in the UN. 
The article sheds light on the theoretical qu:estion about how democratization 
prompts international commitment. To some extent, democratization theories 
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correctly highlight the commitment of countries undergoing democratic tran-
sitions to international organizations, and successfully identify the incentives 
for participation in them. International organizations can assist democratizing 
governments to make credible commitments to reform when domestic channels 
are limited.60 However, the degree and level of international commitment 
varies substantially among democratizing states, since transitions to democracy 
are not homogenous political processes. The paired cases presented here 
support the claim that democratization trends can be affected by a number of 
factors, including civil-military relations and geopolitical factors, which in 
tUfn affect the extent to which countries under democratic transitions commit 
to international organizations. Additional case studies may provide the basis 
for identifying the underlying conditions under which international commitment 
will take place. It would be beneficial to conduct cross regional analysis, compar-
ing democratizing states with other types of polities as well. The Indian and Pakis-
tani or the South African and Nigerian cases come to mind as appropriate subjects 
to test the findings advanced here. 
Finally, the findings may have implications for the UN, given that there have 
been pressures to modify the composition of the Security Council to reflect the 
contemporaty distribution of power in the world. Similarly, there is a great 
need to involve more member states in contributing troops to UN peace oper-
ations. The evidence suggests that the extent to which states commit to the UN 
is not dependent on will, but on geopolitical and domestic considerations. 
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